Theos-Talk Archives (January 1997 Message tl00279)

On Fri, 10 Jan 97, John Straughn <JTarn@envirolink.org> wrote:

>Tom Robertson writes:

>>The problem I have with free will is that it is impossible to choose an
>>alternative which is regarded as anything but the best alternative, and I
>>don't see how perception of the value of alternatives is subject to free
>>will.  

>I can agree with you only if you using "best" as a relative term.  What *I* 
>think is best is not necessarily what you think is best.  

Yes.  That's how I meant it.  There is the real best alternative, there is
my perception of the best alternative, and there is your perception of the
best alternative.


>if you believe that 
>there is no permanent you, no permanent individuality, then free will would 
>seem to be a senseless proposition.

I wouldn't go so far as to say that it is senseless.  We were discussing
free will at our lodge this last Wednesday, and when someone asked what the
definition of free will was, I drew a blank.  I am quite sure there are
limits to its freedom, but that doesn't make it non-existent.  Some people
said it could exist without being conscious, but I don't see how that could
be.  The idea that individuals choose such things as their parents and
place of birth doesn't make sense to me.  


>I'd like to understand your point of view much more clearly, for there are a 
>lot of fine points that need to be understood if we can further continue our 
>conversations.  I've noticed on several occasions that we have agreed with 
>each other on many things without realizing it simply because we use 
>different, ambiguous terms.

Most apparent philosophical disagreements are probably predominantly
semantic misunderstandings.  Everyone speaks a unique language.   


>What do you believe makes up *you* as an individual?

The gospel according to Besant and Leadbeater says that individuality is
atma-buddhi-manas, which carries over from life to life and reincarnates.
They said it.  I believe it.  That settles it.    


>What do you believe "makes you tick" which is eternal and "real"?

I don't see how anything except what is purely abstract could be eternal
and real.  What makes me tick is the same thing that makes everyone and
everything else tick.  It is not peculiar to me.


>What do you believe will happen to both the individual "parts" and the real 
>"parts" after your physical death?

The only thing that is real is what makes up all parts.  No one's physical
death affects what is real, except to rearrange it.  But that does not make
physical death special, since what is real is constantly rearranging,
anyway.  I believe that individuality begins when an animal graduates into
the human kingdom, survives death, reincarnates in every lifetime, and ends
at the graduation out of the human kingdom.